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THE DE-MEDICALISATION OF ASSISTED DYING: IS A LESS MEDICALISED 





In this paper, I contend that there are current, notable examples of the de-medicalisation of assisted 
death. Although assisted dying has been most commonly presented within a medicalised framework 
- a framework revolving around medical concepts and terminology, illnesses and medical 
professionals - the notion of de-medicalisation is employed to suggest that there are emerging 
models of assisted dying in which some medical aspects assumed to be an integral part of the 
phenomenon are both challenged and diminished. Within the social and legal debate surrounding 
assisted death, the focus in recent times appears to have moved away from a medic’s involvement in 
a clinically assisted death to “suicide tourism” and particularly, the matter of relatives “assisting” by 
making travel arrangements and accompanying their loved ones to a country in which according to 
local law, they can receive assistance to die.  Debbie Purdy’s ultimately successful legal action, 
swiftly followed by the publication of the DPP’s’ interim and final policies for cases of assisted suicide 
and the related public consultation,1 have ensured that the matter of relatives facilitating assisted 
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suicide abroad (hereafter RFASA) has been kept at the forefront of public consciousness.2 One of the 
focuses of this paper is the development of RFASA and the possible repercussions of de-medicalising 
the debate surrounding assisted death by focusing on this earlier role in the process of assisted 
suicide played by non-medics. A further purpose is to address ethical and legal matters that arise 
when medicine is not the dominant form of reference for assisted death, by considering cases of 
assisted death that have involved the assistance of a non-medic in the actual suicidal act, and non-
medical grounds for desiring death. Cases of relative assisted suicide (RAS) and mercy-killings carried 
out by relatives raise significantly different issues than cases of physician assisted death. The same is 
true for assistance provided by non-medic professionals. Within the jurisdiction of choice for suicide 
tourism, Switzerland, it most often tends to be volunteer representatives of the Swiss right to die 
organisation Dignitas who are clergy persons, social workers and nurses assisting in the final act of 
suicide, rather than doctors. And significantly, the question of whether an individual must be 
suffering from a medical condition in order for assisted death to be legitimate is increasingly being 
raised.  
 
Taking into account these key matters, my claim is that we are witnessing something of a de-
medicalisation of assisted death. However, there has not been and indeed there is not likely to be, a 
wholesale shift from a medical to a de-medicalised model. In evaluating the potential impact of 
partial de-medicalisation on the assisted dying debate, I argue that whilst a de-medicalised model 
could well contribute to a richer understanding of assisted dying and a better death for the person 
who is assisted, there are cogent reasons to retain some aspects of the medicalised model and that a 
completely de-medicalised model of assisted dying is unrealistic. 
 
I begin by exploring the terms “medicalisation” and “de-medicalisation” and explicating the way in 
which I utilise the latter in the context of assisted death. I then present the three matters which I 
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suggest provide evidence that the debate surrounding assisted death and the phenomenon of 
assisted death itself may be moving away from a more medicalised frame of reference. In the final 
section, I assess the potential positive and negative effects of any such de-medicalisation and 
consider whether a less medicalised model of assisted death should be the way forward. I should 
note at the start that the analysis relates primarily to assisted suicide,3 although (voluntary) 
euthanasia4 and so-called “mercy killings”5 will also be discussed. 
 
 
II. MEDICALISATION, DE-MEDICALISATION AND ASSISTED DEATH 
 
The term medicalisation emerged in the 1970s, through the work of influential authors such as 
Michael Foucault,6 Ivan Illich,7 Thomas Szasz8 and Irving Zola.9 It is a term which has regularly 
appeared in various fields including sociology, bioethics, anthropology and medicine itself ever since. 
Conrad defines medicalisation, as ‘a process by which nonmedical problems become defined and 
treated as medical problems’.10 Lowenberg and Davis identify a number of ideas that the notion of 
medicalisation is framed around, including: ‘that some undesirable condition or problematic human 
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activity previously lying outside the scope of “the medical model”… has in popular thinking and/or 
public policy been brought within its purview’ and that ‘treatment decisions must emanate from and 
be dispensed by qualified health professionals who, by virtue of their training and expertise, are 
insofar as treatment is concerned enjoined to stand superior to those they treat.’11  
 
Theories of medicalisation are concerned with social perceptions and constructions of 
problems.12 Thus, for example, it has been argued that increases in the frequency of diagnosis and 
treatment of Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) are partly the result of behavioural 
problems in children being medicalised and inappropriately diagnosed as ADHD because of parental 
reaction to media coverage of the condition, social anxieties and the Western conception of self.13 
Another example of medicalisation is the portrayal of non-medical objects or products as medical. It 
has been claimed, for instance, that certain food products are promoted as “medicine” through 
advertising, encouraging the perception that unless we purchase the particular food product, our 
bodies are more likely to malfunction.14 
 
Conversely, de-medicalisation can be defined as ‘stripping away medicine as a dominant 
frame of reference to reveal the “true”’ nature of a phenomenon.15 Howarth and Leaman refer to 
the process of de-medicalisation as ‘the point at which the medicalisation of social life is turned 
back, or reversed’.16 The potential for de-medicalisation is growing in an age in which patients have 
much easier access to information on the internet about medical conditions, information which once 
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remained within the medical realm.17 And de-medicalisation is more likely to occur when patients 
are empowered and patient rights are championed and prioritised,18 as is currently the case in 
contemporary Western society. No doubt one of the most prominent examples of de-medicalisation 
is the de-medicalising of normal childbirth in the UK. The 1970s saw the medicalisation of child birth, 
with a hospital birth being the recommended norm,19 but in more recent times, organisations such 
as the National Childbirth Trust campaign for midwife-led birth centres and encourage women to 
have natural births and consider giving birth at home.20 And during their later years in power, the 
previous Labour government indicated a preference for a community based midwifery model and 
woman-focused, family-centred maternity services.21 A further example of de-medicalisation can be 
found in the concept of neurodiversity. The neurodiversity movement emerged from within the 
autistic community in the late 1990s.22 Armstrong explains that neurodiversity’s ‘basic premise is 
that atypical neurological wiring is part of the normal spectrum of human differences and is to be 
tolerated and respected like any other human difference such as race, gender, sexual preference, or 
cultural background.’23 Followers of neurodiversity reject the categorisation of autism as an illness 
that needs curing.24 
 
For as long as we have relied on medicine and physicians in our attempts to prolong life and 
keep death at bay, death and medicalisation have gradually and increasingly gone hand in hand. In 
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the words of Ian Kennedy, dying has become an illness.25 And death, in many cases, has become a 
medical event.26 Notably, however, medicalised aspects are absent from what Seale and van der 
Geest have argued is an almost universal notion of a ‘good death’.27 Yet a 2006 survey suggests that 
only one in three people in the UK will experience a death free from any medical involvement.28 
Medical intervention at the end of life could involve, for example, the provision and subsequent 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, or terminal sedation.29 One effect of medical intervention to 
prolong life has been to extend lives which, to those subjectively experiencing these lives, may be 
lacking in quality. Partly as a consequence of this, but also to offer individuals alternatives to dying in 
a medical setting, there have been developments in end of life care that mark a move away from a 
more medicalised death. The palliative care and natural death movements can both be cited as 
prominent examples of de-medicalisation.30 Moreover, campaigns for a “right to die” can be 
perceived as attempts to prioritise individual autonomy and remove doctors’ control over death.31  
 
For those who find themselves in such a desperate situation that they decide to end their 
own lives (whether this is the result of their medical condition or other factors or events in their 
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lives), there are a variety of medical and non-medical means of committing suicide.32 However, these 
methods are only available to those who have the physical ability to make use of them and thus, 
those who lack this ability are left requiring another person’s assistance to die. Significantly, legal, 
ethical and social discourses surrounding assisted dying and laws that have permitted assisted dying 
have tended to focus on the assistance of doctors, the provision of medicine to cause death and 
medical grounds for requesting death, that is, pain and suffering derived from medical conditions.33 
As such, medicine has provided the main frame of reference, a vital component of the phenomenon 
of assisted death. The common phrase “physician assisted suicide” (PAS) makes this abundantly 
clear. Salem argues that PAS: 
 
presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide… as long as the 
physician is in charge of assisting the patient – either by his or her presence or by supplying 
the medical means to perform the act – physician-assisted suicide entails the 
medicalisation of the act of suicide… the decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if 
it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically – the ‘private’, ‘intimate’, ‘self-
determinating’ decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event.34 
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Given that assistance in suicide is requested in order to bring an end to suffering and distress, it is 
not surprising that the cause of death also tends to be medicalised, and is commonly perceived as 
such, since medication is considered to offer the quickest, humane non-violent end.35 
 
As I will discuss in this paper, however, less medicalised and completely de-medicaIised 
instances of assisted death do occur. A well-publicised example of partially de-medicalised assisted 
death occurred in Australia in 1996, during the short period in which assisted suicide and euthanasia 
were lawful in the Northern Territory.36 Dr Philip Nitschke devised a process of computerised 
assisted death. He provided patients with intravenous access and connected the infusion tubing to a 
laptop computer. The patients then had to answer three questions which appeared on the computer 
screen by pressing certain keys. The final question was as follows: ‘If you press this button, you will 
receive a lethal injection and die in 15 seconds — Do you wish to proceed?’ If the patient answered 
all the questions affirmatively, the computer automatically switched on a previously prepared 
solution of a fatal dose of the sedative Nembutal.37 The use of modern technology might make this 
example of partially de-medicalised assisted death seem somehow dehumanised. However, Nitschke 
stated in an interview that the process ‘allowed me to leave the immediate personal space of the 
patient, so that the family could enter and be closest to the patient when the button was pushed’.38 
Thus, arguably, far from removing the human element, de-medicalising assisted death in this way 
can remove the external presence of a medic and enable the act of dying to be a more personal and 
private experience for the person to share with those she or he is closest to. This is at least one 
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reason that can be given in support of calls for the de-medicalisation of assisted death which have 
appeared of late in the academic literature.39  
 
I am applying the term “de-medicalisation” in the context of assisted death in a number of 
ways in this paper. First, I utilise it to highlight the way in which attention has moved away 
somewhat from the medical aspects of assisted death. Concentrating on the role that relatives play 
in the process of assisted dying by accompanying a loved one abroad may alter perceptions of 
assisted death as being a wholly medical phenomenon, and encourages the use of a less medicalised 
discourse which takes emotional factors into greater account. Secondly, I claim that cases where 
non-medics assist an individual to die raise important questions concerning the basis on which the 
involvement of a doctor legitimises assisted death. Such cases should cause us to ask why a more 
medicalised conception of assisted dying is appropriate or inappropriate and therefore, whether de-
medicalisation is the way forward. Finally, I turn to the common perception that if assisted death is 
lawful, it should only be available to those whose suffering is the result of a medical condition. If the 
availability of an assisted death is extended to those experiencing existential suffering, as has been 
advocated by some, then this could truly amount to a notable form of de-medicalised assisted dying. 
In addressing these issues, the three areas of medicalisation that I am questioning are: the process 





III. TURNING THE DEBATE SURROUNDING ASSISTED DEATH AWAY FROM MEDICAL ISSUES: THE 
PHENOMENON OF RFASA 
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Notwithstanding the de-criminalisation of suicide under s.1 of the Suicide Act 1961, encouraging or 
assisting suicide continues to be an offence under s.2(1) of the same Act.40 This has not completely 
prevented relatives from taking part in assisted suicides, however.41 As I will discuss later, there are 
numerous examples of cases where relatives have assisted in the actual suicidal act (RAS). More 
recently, there has been a spate of well-publicised cases where relatives have provided help by 
making travel arrangements and accompanying a person seeking assistance in their suicide to 
Switzerland, where this act is permitted under certain conditions.42 These include the assisted 
suicides of Reginald Crew (accompanied to Switzerland by his wife and daughter),43 Raymond 
Cutkelvin (accompanied by his partner),44 Craig Ewert (accompanied by his wife and whose assisted 
suicide was filmed and broadcast in a television documentary),45 Daniel James (accompanied by his 
parents),46 Dr Anne Turner (accompanied by her three children)47  and Elaine Wirr (accompanied by 
her husband).48  
 
Of all of these cases, and others, it is probably the Daniel James case which attracted the 
most publicity, no doubt because of Mr James’ young age (twenty three), the fact that his condition 
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was not terminal and the DPP’s subsequent publication of the reasoning behind his decision not to 
prosecute Daniel’s parents.49 Mr James suffered from tetraplegia and was paralysed from the chest 
down with no independent hand or finger movement following a rugby accident which had occurred 
a year and a half before his assisted suicide. He decided he no longer wished to live when it became 
apparent that his condition would not improve and tried to commit suicide three times, 
unsuccessfully. He then contacted the Swiss right-to-die organisation Dignitas in February 2008. The 
process of arranging an assisted suicide began50 and throughout this time, his parents attempted to 
change his mind, without success. They eventually accepted his decision, despite their conflicting 
wishes, and helped facilitate his assisted suicide in Switzerland by making travel arrangements along 
with a family friend and accompanying him to Switzerland.51 Daniel James’ assisted suicide took 
place on 12 September 2008. Following a police investigation, the DPP decided that there was 
sufficient evidence to prosecute Mr and Mrs James and the family friend for the s.2(1) offence, but 
he concluded that it was not in the public interest to bring a prosecution.52 The DPP emphasised the 
fact that Mr and Mrs James did not influence their son and that he was ‘a mature, intelligent and 
fiercely independent young man with full capacity to make decisions about his medical treatment’. 
That they did not stand to gain (financially or otherwise) from their son’s death was also an 
important factor in the DPP’s decision. In his view, their actions were ‘towards the less culpable end 
of the spectrum’ of acts that were prohibited under s.2(1).53 
 
For Daniel James and others who need assistance to die, the external power of the law 
denies them the possibility of an assisted death in their home, local area or indeed, their country of 
residence and their reaction to the legal prohibition of assisted suicide is to travel elsewhere, with 
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the assistance of a relative, in order to experience the kind of death which they seek. Thus, this non-
medical part of the process of assisted dying in such cases is occurring because English law prohibits 
assisted death. The final act of assisted dying in such cases is, at least in part, a medical one, since 
death is caused by the ingestion of lethal medication prescribed by a physician in Switzerland. 
However, the recent focus on the involvement of relatives in the earlier stages of the process of 
assisted suicide is indicative of a certain de-medicalising of assisted death, because media coverage 
of assisted death and the attention of the public, prosecutors, law-makers and judges is directed on 
a non-medical aspect of assisted dying.  
 
Besides drawing attention to the earlier non-medical parts of the process, RFASA cases also 
emphasise the significance of relatives being present during the final stages of an assisted death. 
There are a number of reasons why it might be important for individuals seeking an assisted death to 
have their relatives present for the final act of assisted suicide, and why this could be an essential 
part of their experience of an assisted death. First, this may make the assisted death feel less 
medicalised and less clinical and thus, a less tense affair. Secondly, it might reassure the person 
concerned that their relatives approve of their decision, or at least that they are at peace with their 
decision to die. Thirdly, they may need the emotional support that their relatives provide.54 Their 
experience of assisted death is therefore a better death because they are accompanied throughout 
the process by their loved ones. Lesley Close, who accompanied her brother to Switzerland for an 
assisted suicide through Dignitas, emphasised the significance of his ‘chance to say goodbye, to 
interact with us at that last moment.’55 According to Dr Turner’s son, the family ‘chatted, sang some 
songs and joked’ in the final hours before her death.56 For relatives, being present at their loved 
one’s death may be equally important so that they can see their wish for an assisted death being 
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fulfilled, share their final moments of life with them and ensure that they do not have an isolated 
death.57 They may reaffirm their support for their loved one’s decision through their attendance. Mr 
Cutkelvin’s partner stated: ‘I wanted to be with him because this was what he wanted, to die in a 
dignified and peaceful manner, which is what happened.’58 
 
Whilst in the cases above RFASA had already occurred, the prominent case of Debbie Purdy 
related to future, intended RFASA. Crucially, Debbie Purdy was not seeking an immunity from 
prosecution for her husband, Omar Puente.59 Rather, her argument revolved around the DPP’s 
exercise of discretion as to whether to bring a prosecution for assisted suicide under s.2(1), laid 
down by s.2(4) of the 1961 Act. In seeking judicial review of the DPP’s refusal to publish a 
prosecution policy for the s.2(1) offence at her request, she relied on the principle of legality under 
Article 8(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which requires that state 
interference with Article 8 rights must be ‘in accordance with the law’ and thus that the law be 
accessible and precise in order for individuals to know in advance whether their conduct will be 
unlawful.60 She claimed that Article 8(2) demanded clarification in the law in the form of a clear 
statement of policy from the DPP setting out the factors which will be taken into account in 
ascertaining whether it is in the public interest to bring a prosecution. Both the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal judged that her Article 8 rights were not engaged.61 This was somewhat inevitable 
given that both courts were, of course, constrained by the decision of the House of Lords in Pretty v 
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 BE Chabot and A Goedhart, ‘A survey of self-directed dying attended by proxies in the Dutch population’ 
(2009) 68(10) Social Science and Medicine 1745, 1746. 
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 Unlike Dianne Pretty. See R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 AC 800 and later, section IV.A). 
60
 See especially paras 40 and 43. 
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DPP.62 Both courts also concluded that the DPP’s refusal to produce a crime-specific policy did not 
make the offence relating to assisted suicide not in accordance with law under article 8(2).63 
 
However in a unanimous judgment in July 2009, the House of Lords allowed Debbie Purdy’s 
appeal.64 Significantly, in departure from the House of Lords’ decision in Pretty but in accord with the 
European Court of Human Rights judgment in Pretty v UK,65 it was held that Article 8 rights are 
engaged and interfered with by the prohibition on assisted suicide66 and that the DPP was obliged to 
produce an offence-specific policy pertaining to the approach to prosecution for the s.2(1) offence.67 
The judges considered both the Code for Crown Prosecutors68 and the DPP’s publication of his 
decision in the Daniel James case,69 but found that neither provided sufficient guidance as to how 
prosecutorial discretion is likely to be exercised in cases such as Debbie Purdy’s.70 As expressed by 
Lord Hope: 
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assisted suicide fell within the ambit of the s.2(1) offence. There was an interesting difference of opinion on 
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decided assisting a suicide is a serious wrong that should remain an offence, parliament would have intended 
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final act of suicide occurs elsewhere.  
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 Decision of Prosecution, above n.49.  
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In most cases [the Code’s] application will ensure predictability and consistency of 
decision-taking, and people will know where they stand. But that cannot be said of cases 
where the offence in contemplation is aiding or abetting the suicide of a person who is 
terminally ill or severely and incurably disabled, who wishes to be helped to travel to a 
country where assisted suicide is lawful and who, having the capacity to take such a 
decision, does so freely and with a full understanding of the consequences. There is already 
an obvious gulf between what section 2(1) says and the way that the subsection is being 
applied in practice in compassionate cases of that kind.71 
 
Lord Hope also highlighted the very real possibility that in other cases, factors which did not apply in 
the Daniel James case might be present, such as the relatives standing to gain a benefit (financial, for 
example) from the individual’s death. Yet such a potential benefit in itself might not mean that 
prosecution would be in the public interest.72 Thus, the DPP’s decision in the Daniel James case was 
specific to its facts and did not clarify the likely position regarding prosecution for others who wished 
to assist a relative’s suicide. There is indeed likely to be a financial benefit in many cases of RFASA 
and RAS. As Mullock has opined, surely a number of those relatives in RFASA cases such as those 
mentioned above must have received some kind of financial gain by virtue of inheritance after the 
assisted suicide, but regardless, none have been prosecuted.73 The only conclusion can be that Lord 
Hope’s view is correct; financial gain in itself is not going to lead to a decision that it is in the public 
interest to prosecute.74  
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In September 2009, the DPP fulfilled the obligation that the House of Lords’ judges placed 
him under, and produced an interim policy regarding cases of assisted suicide for public 
consultation.75 After this consultation, the final policy was published in February 2010.76 It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to engage in a detailed analysis of the policy, but briefly, it outlines public 
interest factors in favour of prosecution in cases where, amongst other things: 
 
 the victim77 was under 18 years of age 
 her/his capacity was in question 
 s/he ‘had not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide’ 
 s/he ‘had not clearly and unequivocally communicated his or her decision to commit suicide 
to the suspect’ 
 the victim did not ask the suspect on her/his own initiative for assistance or encouragement 
 the suspect was ‘not wholly motivated by compassion’ but, for example, was motivated 
because s/he stood to gain from the victim’s death 
 ‘the suspect pressured the victim to commit suicide’  
 ‘the victim was physically able to undertake the act that constituted the assistance’ 
herself/himself  
 the suspect was acting in her/his capacity as a health care professional, ‘or as a person in 
authority’78 
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 See above, n.1. The consultation period was twelve weeks. 
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 Ibid. For the DPP’s response to the public consultation, the summary of responses and an explanation of the 
differences between the interim and final policies, see CPS, Public Consultation Exercise on the Interim Policy 
for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Assisted Suicide (Crown, London 2010) available at 
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 the suspect was acting in her/his capacity as a person involved with an organisation or group 
that provides a physical environment in which another can commit suicide79  
 
Conversely, there are public interest factors tending against prosecution if, amongst other things: 
 
 the victim ‘had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide’ 
 the suspect was ‘wholly motivated by compassion’  
 the suspect’s actions ‘were of only minor encouragement or assistance’  
 the suspect’s actions could ‘be characterised as reluctant encouragement or assistance in 
the face of’ the victim’s determined wish to commit suicide80 
 
Any one factor can be considered to ‘outweigh a number of other factors which tend in the opposite 
direction’81 and thus, for example, if there is clear evidence that the suspect was motivated by gain, 
this might outweigh the existence of several of the public interest factors against prosecution listed 
above. One potential difficulty here is that this motivation of gain is surely not going to be easy to 
prove and the mere fact that the assistor stands to gain could exist in many cases, as discussed 
above. The DPP’s policy notes that ‘sometimes… the only source of information about the 
circumstances of the suicide… is the suspect’ and advocates a ‘common sense approach’ to the issue 
of whether a person stood to gain, emphasising that the ‘critical element is the motive behind the 
suspect’s act’.82 All this is undoubtedly true, but the question remains: what counts as clear evidence 
of selfish motivation?  
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Notably, as Lord Brown observed in Purdy, whilst the DPP has produced statements 
providing details of the policy for prosecution in the case of other offences, such statements have 
been issued for the benefit of the victims of offences such as rape, rather than for the benefit of 
prospective offenders. But reliance on the Article 8 rights of individuals who require assistance in 
their suicides justified the production of a policy statement to effectively assist would-be assistors.83 
This only serves to emphasise the uniqueness of the legal reaction to cases involving RFASA. It may 
well have become necessary to produce this policy because Parliament did not envisage the 
phenomenon of suicide tourism when the s.2(1) offence was drafted. Nonetheless, the result is that 
the impact of RFASA cases has meant that those who violate the law by assisting a suicide are 
effectively being treated differently than all other offenders, by being given specific guidance as to 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion regarding their criminality. Significantly, therefore, the focus 
on the non-medical role played by relatives has moved the law on assisted suicide forward. 
 
There was clear judicial sympathy for relatives in Omar Puente’s predicament in the Purdy 
case. Such cases were described as compassionate by more than one of the judges; both Lord Hope 
and Baroness Hale referred to the actions of relatives who assist a loved one to travel abroad for an 
assisted suicide as ‘compassionate assistance’.84 In Lord Neuberger’s view, RFASA cases are ‘difficult 
and tragic cases where a loving relative assists a person, who is of sound mind and determined to 
end her life, to travel abroad to achieve her wish in a country where assisting suicide is not 
unlawful’85 and he considered that a relative in such a case ‘will often be a relatively reluctant 
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participator, and will often be motivated solely by love and/or sympathy’.86 Such an understanding 
of compassionate and reluctant assistance is mirrored in the DPP’s policy.87  
 
It is surely true that more compassion is likely to be felt for a relative who assists a loved one 
to die in this way than a health care professional who assists in the final act causing death. Although, 
as Biggs notes, the euthanasia case of R v Cox ‘provoked an emotional response from those who 
were involved’,88 it was arguably not so much that the jury and judge felt compassion for the 
doctor’s situation, but rather, that they were sympathetic to his motivation. In contrast, it is easier 
to feel compassion for a relative assistor because of the dilemma they find themselves in when their 
loved one asks for their assistance to die, a dilemma which must be exacerbated by the strong 
attachment they have. Horder has differentiated relatives from other parties involved in assisted 
dying on the basis that the former act compassionately because they are ‘caught in the maelstrom of 
circumstances’.89  
 
Given the common shared experience of being in a close, loving relationship, more people 
can imagine themselves in the position of a relative assistor than a medic assistor. It goes without 
saying that no one in a loving relationship such as that of Ms Purdy and Mr Puente would wish to be 
in this predicament. But arguably, if we imagine ourselves faced with the same situation, many of us 
could understand why relatives decide to assist and no doubt some of us might see ourselves doing 
the same for our loved ones. In accord with Blum’s explanation of compassion, this is a situation 
where we ‘come to understand someone’s condition by imagining what our own reactions would be’ 
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and emotionally responding to their predicament.90 Speaking in an interview about his wife’s 
assisted suicide through Dignitas, Mr Witt commented that ‘When you see a loved-one coolly and 
thoughtfully asking you to do it, I don’t see how you can refuse, how you can’t show that 
compassion.’91 Daniel James’ mother emailed the following comment to the Daily Telegraph’s 
website, referring to the person working for social services who had reported her and her husband’s 
actions to the police: ‘I hope that one day I will get the chance to speak to this lady and ask if she 
had a son, daughter, father, mother, who could not walk, had no hand function, was incontinent, 
and relied upon 24-hour care for every basic need and they had asked her for support, what would 
she have done?’92 This direct question challenges us all to imagine how we would respond in the 
face of such an awful predicament. Moreover, feeling empathy because one is able to put oneself in 
the shoes of a relative is more likely in the context of RFASA cases, because of the lesser role played 
by the relative as compared with a relative who assists in the final act of suicide. Thus, as a 
consequence of the close, emotional relationship between the person who wishes to die and the 
relative who facilitates their assisted suicide, RFASA cases encourage a less medicalised discourse 
surrounding assisted death, one that is more emotive and empathetic.  
 
The spate of RFASA cases has had a definite impact on the legislature. Both Patricia Hewitt’s 
and Lord Falconer’s recent unsuccessful attempts to bring about legal reform by amending the 
Coroner’s and Justice Bill 2009 were directed to decriminalising the act of assisting a relative or 
friend to go abroad and seek assisted suicide.93 Notwithstanding the focus on the actions of non-
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medic assistors, the proposed process under Lord Falconer’s amendment would still have involved 
medical professionals since, in order for RFASA to fall outside the criminal law, it would have been 
necessary for two doctors to certify that the individual was suffering from a terminal illness and had 
the capacity to request assisted suicide.94 The amendment was defeated (194 peers were against it 
and 141 were in favour of it).95 Clearly, the amendment’s defeat does not mark the end of the 
matter. Last year, for instance, a Labour MP expressed his intention to bring a private member’s bill 
before the House of Commons in the near future to ensure that the legal position on assisted suicide 
is debated.96 
 
Centring proposals for law reform on de-criminalising RFASA cases means that the 
controversial medical issues of public trust in the medical profession and of assisted death being 
against ethical principles that the medical profession abides by are not crucial obstacles that must be 
overcome, as they are when proposed reforms related to physician assisted death. Rather, these 
issues are left for the country in which assisted suicide is lawfully practised. However, as I will  later 
argue, any reform which does relate to RFASA cases may pave the way for future reform that could 
relate to PAS and thus, to a re-medicalisation of the debate. That permitting RFASA was the first step 
on a slippery slope to legalising assisted dying was certainly a concern for some of the peers who 
participated in the House of Laws debate on Lord Falconer’s amendment.97 
 
In sum here, RFASA cases pose significantly different issues than more medicalised cases of 
assisted dying such as Cox for example. The issue of feeling compassion for the assistor enters into 
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the social and legal debate regarding RFASA cases much more; there is a real sense of empathy with 
the predicament that relatives face. This seems to be at least part of the reason why prosecutions 
have not been brought in the case of relatives who accompany an individual abroad for an assisted 
death98 and why the matter of prosecution and possible law reform has become a particular concern 
for the judiciary and legislature of late. Whether this means that legal reform should be framed 
around such cases of de-medicalisation is a different matter, which I will consider in the final section. 
 
 
IV. THE PHENOMENON OF ASSISTED DYING AS LESS OF A MEDICAL ISSUE 
 
A. Mercy killings, RAS cases and the involvement of (professional) non-medics in the final act of 
assisted death 
 
The prominence of the phenomenon of RFASA may well have turned the social and legal debates 
regarding assisted suicide away from a more medicalised framework. But there are, of course, also a 
number of well-publicised cases where relatives have assisted in the final act of suicide or carried 
out a mercy killing which have occurred in the UK over the past few decades.99 And RAS and mercy 
killing cases are not just phenomena occurring in the UK.100 To give just one example of a recent 
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much-publicised British case, in 2008, Kay Gilderdale administered morphine to her thirty one year 
old daughter who was paralysed and unable to swallow due to the condition of ME, which she had 
been suffering from since the age of fourteen. Although Mrs Gilderdale pleaded guilty to aiding and 
abetting her daughter Lynn’s suicide, the DPP pursued a charge of attempted murder since he 
considered that the evidence suggested that she went further than assisting and directly took her 
daughter’s life. Mrs Gilderdale was found not guilty by a jury who reached a unanimous verdict after 
less than two hours deliberation. She was released with a one year conditional discharge. The trial 
judge’s criticism of the attempted murder charge and sympathy towards Kay Gilderdale was notable. 
101 
 
Medicine is not the dominant form of reference which reveals the true nature of assisted 
death in RAS cases. Again, as in cases of RFASA, the relationship of love and affection is a significant 
factor which generates empathy for the relative who assists in a severely ill person’s suicide, a factor 
which is not present in a more medicalised assisted death, where the assistor is a physician. The 
relative’s act is almost seen as an act of love, albeit an unlawful one. For example, in a 2006 case 
where a husband pleaded guilty to the offence of aiding and abetting his wife’s suicide, Judge Brian 
Barker emphasised that the defendant was ‘a husband who not only had a deep love for his wife but 
who displayed a selfless devotion to her.’102 A further distinction between RAS and mercy killing 
cases on the one hand, and physician assisted death on the other, is that a relative is likely to find it 
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much harder to resist fulfilling their loved one’s wish that their suffering be brought to an end. 
Examining the case of those who take on the role of informal carer for an individual suffering from a 
chronic condition and provide assistance with that individual’s suicide (most often a relative or 
spouse), Biggs considers the impact of the close relationship between the carer and the cared for 
person: ‘Not only does this make informal carers vulnerable to pressures that professional carers 
might reasonably be expected to resist, it can also generate a sense of obligation that will encourage 
a carer to comply with the will of the cared for person.’103 Yet Biggs argues that if carers assist and 
criminal culpability is established, the law will draw little distinction between them or a health care 
professional who assists.104 In the context of relatives and spouses who carry out mercy killings and 
are charged with murder, however, I have suggested elsewhere that the availability of the defence 
of diminished responsibility to reduce the charge to one of voluntary manslaughter means that such 
defendants can be treated more leniently by the law than physicians who carry out euthanasia.105 It 
also seems that the judiciary tends to carry this leniency through to the sentencing stage.106  
 
The defence of diminished responsibility is currently available in mercy killing cases if the 
defendant was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised 
medical condition which substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to do one or more of the 
following:  understand the nature of her/his conduct; form a rational judgement; exercise self-
control). The abnormality of mental functioning must have been a significant contributory factor in 
causing him/her to act.107 Given the accepted reliance on this defence in such cases, it is here that 
the legal response evidences a clear medicalised approach to otherwise non-medicalised instances 
of assisted death. Psychiatric experts play a considerable role in determining whether the defence of 
diminished responsibility will be available, since it is their assessment as to whether the mercy killer 
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was suffering from an “abnormality of the mind” which counts. But Huxtable has persuasively 
argued that abnormality of the mind can be inferred by psychiatrists even where the mercy killer is 
“mentally normal”, and that it is easy for stress to be labelled as a medical condition.108 This raises 
the question of whether there is a legal fudge going on here; medicalisation through the practical 
operation of the diminished responsibility defence makes the mercy killer’s actions more excusable 
at law, even when the reality is that there may be no medical cause for his or her actions. It would 
seem that the desire to treat mercy killers with compassion can be fulfilled if a medical explanation 
for their behaviour can be found. Medicalisation of the mercy killer’s behaviour thus provides this 
sympathetic legal response with a cloak of respectability.  
 
Turning back to RAS, the most prominent case which would have involved such an assisted 
death if the applicant had been successful in her legal battle is that of Dianne Pretty. The declaration 
that Mrs Pretty sought - that s.2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 was incompatible with various Articles 
under the ECHR - and the facts of the case are well-known.109 For the purposes of this paper, I wish 
to focus on the reason why the European Court of Human Rights reached the conclusion that the 
violation of Mrs Pretty’s right to personal autonomy under Article 8 of the ECHR was justifiable. The 
Court drew attention to the need to protect ‘the weak and vulnerable and especially those who are 
not in a condition to take informed decisions against acts intended to end life or to assist in ending 
life.’110 This particular concern is arguably greater if there is no objective, external involvement in the 
assisted suicide. Taking advantage of vulnerability is easier if the person in question is under the 
relative’s sole care twenty four hours a day and the motivation to act in this way could exist if there 
will be some (financial) gain for the relative following the person’s death. This is something to bear 
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in mind regarding a number of the public interest factors in favour of prosecution as stated in the 
DPP’s prosecution policy. It may be easier for a relative to pressure on the victim, for example, 
without detection. If objective involvement from someone other than relative/carer is considered 
preferable to better protect the vulnerable, the crucial question which I will address in the final 
concluding section is whether this has to be the involvement of a physician. Lord Bingham 
emphasised the fact that Dianne Pretty’s assisted suicide was likely to be a non-medicalised one in 
the House of Lords’ judgment in Pretty: ‘[The DPP] received no information at all concerning the 
means proposed for ending Mrs Pretty’s life. No medical supervision was proposed.’111 Notably, this 
may evidence an assumption that external involvement in an assisted death should come from a 
doctor and thus, an acceptance of the dominant medical model of assisted death. As I will argue 
later, this need not be the case.  
 
Whilst RAS and mercy killings are forms of assisted dying that clearly lack a medical 
dimension, they do not necessarily indicate that assisted suicide is becoming de-medicalised. Those 
who are assisted in their death by relatives or friends could not have received PAS under the law in 
this jurisdiction, and thus their positions have not become de-medicalised; they were never 
medicalised in the first place. However, in Switzerland, a different form of lawful non-medic assisted 
death has attracted legal and social attention which may be more indicative of a move towards 
partial de-medicalisation, because it is a newer phenomenon occurring as part of a process which 
also involves a doctor. Assisted suicide is a criminal offence under Article 115 of the Swiss Penal 
Code if carried out for reasons of self interest.112 The context in which assisted suicide is lawful as a 
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consequence of Article 115’s limited prohibition is of significant note. Crucially, there is no 
medicalised construction of the circumstances in which assisted death can be permissible; provided 
there is no selfish motivation, and the person being assisted is competent,113 anyone can assist. A 
physician’s involvement is required, however, since Pentobarbital, the drug used in cases of assisted 
suicide, is only available on prescription.114 The physician who prescribes the drug must assess the 
individual’s competency and his/her medical condition.115 But this tends to be the extent of the 
physician’s role, as it is most often a volunteer from a right-to-die organisation who provides vital 
assistance by, for example, collecting the prescription and storing it, mixing the drug and giving it to 
the person for the actual act of suicide (the last step in this final act must be taken by the individual 
who wishes to die),116 besides making an initial assessment of the individual. Volunteers of the right-
to-die organisations are often clergypersons, social workers or nurses who will receive training in 
matters such as counselling.117 Significantly, then, this form of non-medic assisted death tends to 
involve professional non-medics.  
 
In the early 1980s, two right-to-die organisations were founded in the French and German 
speaking areas of Switzerland, Exit Association pour le Droit de Mourir dans la Dignité and Exit 
Deutsche Schweiz. Dignitas, one of the two right-to-die organisations that accept non-residents, was 
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founded in 1998.118 The four right-to-die organisations provide assistance to individuals throughout 
the assisted suicide process. For Dignitas, this process involves a number of steps: 
 
1. The individual requesting an assisted suicide must become a member of the organisation. 
2. S/he must send a letter to Dignitas stating the reason for requesting an assisted suicide, 
accompanied by a medical file/report regarding diagnosis, prognosis etc. 
3. There is an initial assessment of whether Dignitas’ guidelines are satisfied (the individual 
must be suffering from a fatal disease or have an unacceptable disability).119 
4. Dignitas finds one of their collaborating Swiss physicians who will state an initial willingness 
to write a prescription (usually about two and a half months after the initial request). 
5. An appointment with this physician is made and the physician conducts a detailed medical 
assessment of the individual. A period of around two months is usual between this and the 
next step.120 
6. A volunteer from Dignitas is present and assists during the final part of the assisted suicide 
process. Before the final act, the individual is asked again whether s/he still wishes to die 
and a declaration of suicide is signed. 
7. The individual takes anti-vomiting medication, followed by Pentobarbital about half an hour 
later. 
8. A representative of Dignitas informs the police that an assisted suicide has occurred.121  
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According to the results of a survey published in 2003, in 92 per cent of cases where a doctor was 
involved in the assisted suicide process, a right-to-die organisation was also involved.122 This 
indicates that the majority of assisted suicides occurring in Switzerland (excluding RAS cases) are 
assisted by professional non-medics. Those occurring with the assistance of right-to-die 
organisations in the case of Swiss residents often take place in the resident’s own home and 
consequently can be seen to de-medicalise assisted death to an even greater extent because ‘the 
home can once again become the location of death, freed from invasive medical procedures and 
regarded as a natural event rather than a medical one that occurs at some remote institution staffed 
by strangers.’123 
 
To consider the occurrence of non-medic assisted death in another jurisdiction, whilst in the 
Netherlands assisted death carried out by non-medics remains unlawful,124 such assistance does 
occur and prosecutions have resulted.125 A recent example of assistance from a member of a right-
to-die organisation can be found in a decision of the District Court in Almelo, pronounced in May 
2009.126 The Court found Gerard Schellekens, the president of a Dutch right-to-die organisation, 
guilty of the offence of assisted suicide127 and he was sentenced to ten months imprisonment. He 
had assisted an eighty year old woman suffering from Parkinson’s Disease by providing her children 
with Pentobarbital, which she then took herself. The Court judged Schellekens to have assisted as a 
non-medic and emphasised that the Dutch legislation evidenced the legislature’s intention that 
assisted suicide should only be lawful in cases in which there would be medical supervision of the 
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process and procedure, and where a doctor’s decision would be scrutinised afterwards.128 In this 
particular case, the doctor treating the woman had refused to assist her suicide. The Court stated 
that it would only be in truly exceptional, catastrophic circumstances such those of war, where there 
were no doctors available, that a non-medic’s act of assisted suicide or euthanasia could be lawfully 
excused. This judgment provides a clear illustration of the way in which Dutch law is wholly imbued 
by the medical model of assisted death; assisted dying can only be legitimate if performed by a 
doctor within a medicalised framework, as will be further demonstrated in the next section. 
Whether Dutch society is only prepared to accept medicalised assisted death is another matter, 
however.  One interesting point made in the judgment in this case is that for many Dutch people, the 
current law does not go far enough and that what Schellekens did in this case might be a way of 
acting that they approve of. 
 
 
B. The matter of whether “pain and suffering” as a criterion for lawful assisted death should be 
extended to suffering where the cause is non-medical 
 
It is not for society to tell people what to value about their own lives. But it may be 
justifiable for society to insist that we value their lives even if they do not… The House, 
when debating Lord Falconer’s amendment, was clearly concerned that some of the 
people who had made use of the services of Dignitas in Switzerland were not suffering 
from terminal or seriously debilitating diseases… a relevant question must be in what 
circumstances the law is justified in interfering with a genuinely autonomous choice.129 
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The phenomenon of assisted dying will always retain a significant medicalised aspect whilst there is 
a requirement that suffering stems from a medical condition in order for an assisted death to be 
(perceived as) legitimate. Furthermore, as Baroness Hale’s statement in Purdy above indicates, 
legislation or proposed legislation permitting the practice of assisted dying tends to be limited to 
cases where individuals’ suffering is caused by terminal or incurable medical conditions.130 Although 
respect for autonomy is one of the main grounds relied on by proponents of assisted death, it seems 
that autonomy in this context has limits imposed on it. But should it only be the autonomy of an 
individual suffering as a result of a medical condition that is respected? As Huxtable and Möller 
observe, ‘“Suffering” itself is not a medical term and obviously, although “illness” is a significant 
cause thereof, it by no means commands a monopoly.’131 If compassion and the desire to act in 
accordance with an individual’s autonomy are the main grounds for allowing assisted death, and we 
accept that existential suffering can subjectively be as unbearable as suffering caused by a medical 
condition, then it is hard to defend permitting assisted death only in cases where suffering stems 
from medical condition. Furthermore, if there is no treatment available to lessen existential 
suffering, it could be less bearable than some forms of physical and psychiatric illnesses which can 
be treated.  
 
In the Netherlands, the legal basis for allowing assisted death exists under the Termination 
of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2002, which effectively ratified 
existing legal practice. Doctors can lawfully carry out euthanasia or an assisted suicide provided they 
comply with the due care criteria laid down in the Act. The criteria includes, amongst other things, 
that: the patient’s request be ‘voluntary and carefully considered’; her suffering is ‘unbearable’ and 
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there is no prospect of improvement in her condition; that both doctor and patient are convinced 
there is no reasonable alternative and the doctor has consulted an independent physician.132 The 
doctor must notify the municipal pathologist as required by the Law on Burial and Cremation.133 The 
due care criteria has been interpreted as requiring a medical condition which has led to the person 
desiring euthanasia or assisted suicide. This interpretation was put to the test by the Brongersma 
case in 2000-2003.  
 
A District Court in Haarlem first heard the case in 2000. The defendant, Doctor Sutorius, was 
alleged to have assisted Mr Brongersma in his suicide. Mr Brongersma no longer had any desire to 
live a life he considered futile and lonely without his deceased friends and family and had 
consequently made repeated requests to Doctor Sutorius to assist him in his suicide. Mr 
Brongersma’s suffering had no somatic cause, nor was it the result of any psychiatric illness. The 
central question for the court was whether this suffering could be described as unbearable, in 
accordance with the due care criteria. Was it legitimate to end Mr Brongersma’s life to relieve 
unbearable existential suffering? An independent psychiatrist gave evidence in court that there was 
no treatment which could alleviate Mr Brongersma’s suffering. The court also heard from an ethicist, 
who stated his opinion that Mr Brongersma’s suffering could be perceived to be unbearable, 
brought about by a state of hopelessness from which only death would provide any relief. The 
District Court judged that the doctor had acted in accordance with the due care criteria and 
acquitted Sutorius. An appeal was then made to the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam on the ground of 
whether the unbearable suffering criteria would extend to a situation where a patient wishes to die 
because he feels that his life is futile and utterly hopeless. The Court of Appeal held that the 
existential suffering could not be described as unbearable under the due care criteria. Whilst 
Sutorius was convicted of assisting his patient’s suicide, the Court of Appeal chose not to pass any 
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sentence upon him because of the compassionate motivation behind his act.134 In 2003, in the final 
judgment in the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment, holding that a 
physician who ends life in such circumstances acts outside of his professional duty.135 The Supreme 
Court differentiated between suffering caused by a medical ailment (whether mental or physical), 
and psychological suffering. When a case involved the latter, a doctor’s medical expertise did not 
equip him or her to decide whether the due care criteria had been met.136 
 
The limitation of the due care criteria to unbearable suffering caused by a medical condition 
has been critiqued by Griffiths, Weyers and Adams. Citing empirical evidence regarding the views of 
the Dutch population137 and the report of the Dijkhuis Committee, a Committee appointed by the 
Royal Dutch Medical Association in support of their case, they argue that the distinction drawn 
between suffering derived from medical conditions and existential suffering is hard to defend and 
problematic in practice.138 Indeed, Huxtable and Möller contend that ‘Once “life fatigue” is 
understood as a form of suffering, we have no logical warrant for debarring euthanasia as a 
response thereto.’139 It is thus notable that recent research indicates that in cases where a request 
for physician assisted dying is refused, patients consider that the doctor did not understand their 
suffering and that patients place much more emphasis on psychosocial suffering whereas their 
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doctors are more likely to concentrate on physical suffering.140 But ascertaining the nature and 
extent of non-medical suffering is a highly subjective task, and conclusions as to whether such 
suffering is ‘unbearable’ could vary in each individual case. Thus, a potential danger of loosening the 
medical criteria for assisted death is that it becomes harder to identify and maintain boundaries.141 
That being said, it may actually be no more of a subjective task than ascertaining the level of pain 
caused by medical conditions, since it is a well known fact that everyone has different pain 
thresholds.142 A further related danger is that in extending the criteria to non-medically based 
suffering, society risks encouraging an assisted dying culture, with an assisted death being seen as an 
option whenever life becomes especially taxing or difficult.143 And related to this concern, we might 
ask whether assistance should really be provided if the person is not prevented from ending their 
own life by a medical condition. The answer here may differ depending on whether the person 
before us is an able-bodied person, or a person who is increasingly immobile not because of a 
medical condition, but simply because of old age. Moreover, the answer may also depend on the 
level of assistance that is required to enable the individual to avail himself/herself of the best 
possible death (for example, providing a lethal prescription of drugs may be necessary to facilitate 
this, whereas administering a lethal injection may not). Such questions and concerns explain the 
tendency of calls for the legalisation of some form of assisted death to be limited to cases where 
unbearable or intolerable suffering is of a medical origin.  
 
 Perhaps extending permissible assisted death to cases of existential suffering is also 
problematic because of problems of defining such suffering, beyond being able to say that it is 
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caused by social rather than medical factors. It has been suggested that individuals can become so 
“weary of life” that they wish to die because of ‘circumstances such as the loss of a partner, 
increasing isolation due to death of people around them, and physical ailments [which] can make 
everyday life… a negative experience’.144 But confusion is caused by the existence of a more 
medicalised notion of existential pain. Strang et al argue that there is no uniform definition of 
“existential pain”, but rather, there are varying ideas that it is constituted by existential suffering 
and/or pain as it is physically understood.145 The results of their study involving chaplains, palliative 
physicians and pain specialists revealed that: 
 
The hospital chaplains of this study defined [existential pain] exclusively as existential 
suffering, with an emphasis on existential guilt and unresolved religious questions. The 
palliative care physicians focused on issue of meaning and death anxiety, which can amplify 
the suffering from pain and which definitely reduce quality of life regardless of whether 
pain is present. The pain specialists emphasized the pain of living, with never-ending 
suffering, particularly in relation to chronic pain.146 
 
Further blurring of the boundaries between existential suffering and pain caused by a medical 
condition emerge because of the concept of “total pain” in palliative care, which encompasses 
‘physical symptoms [of an illness], mental distress, social problems and spiritual needs’.147 And being 
“tired of life” can be a reason for desiring an assisted death for individuals who have a severe 
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disease, just as it can for those who do not.148 This is important, since it indicates that even in cases 
where individuals meet the common medical model of assisted death, they do not request assisted 
dying wholly for medical reasons.149 Moreover, ‘the domain of medicine is hopelessly ill defined, 
such that it cannot easily be objected that “life fatigue” falls outside its perimeters.’150 Consider here 
the proposed psychiatric disorder of “demoralisation syndrome” (DS).151 Parker explains that 
according to palliative care health professionals who have proposed DS, for its sufferers:  
 
The future is perceived as hopeless from a present state of pessimism, helplessness, loss of 
purpose and meaning and entrapment. There may be associated social isolation but this 
too is not essential to the diagnosis. Researchers cite evidence of other associations, 
including old age, disfigurement, disability, dependency, concern about being a burden on 
others, fear of loss of dignity and importantly, a desire for death.152  
 
A range of potential forms of treatment for DS, including cognitive behaviour therapy, have been 
suggested.153 Such moves to medicalise existential suffering can only increase the potential for 
uncertainty as to whether such suffering has, or must have, a medical basis.  
 
Public opinion in the UK on whether non-medical suffering should be a valid ground for 
requesting an assisted death is not easy to gauge. However, the results of a British Social Attitudes 
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survey in 2005 suggest that only a minority would support the occurrence of assisted death in such a 
situation.154 Participants were asked whether they would support a change in the law to permit 
assisted dying in questions framed around a medicalised presentation of reasons for requesting 
assisted death.155 They were asked for their opinion in a situation where (i) an individual has a 
terminal, incurable and painful illness, or (ii) an incurable, painful but non-terminal illness, or (iii) is 
‘not in much pain nor in danger of death, but becomes permanently and completely dependent on 
relatives for all their needs’.156 There was a strong level of support for legal change in respect of the 
first situation (four out of five people), which decreased to 45 per cent in the second situation and 
43 per cent in the third. As the lowest number of participants supported lawful assisted dying where 
an individual’s medical condition is not terminal or incurable, it is not unreasonable to surmise that 
this number would have decreased again if they had been presented with a case where the suffering 
was existential.  
 
It is undeniably more controversial to advocate assisted death when the cause of the 
suffering is non-medical. But is this in fact a consequence of the power of the medical model of 
assisted death? Have we become so imbued by medicalisation that the idea that suffering which 
originates from a non-medical cause could be unbearable is automatically rejected as fallacious? And 
because assisted death is so commonly placed within a medical framework, does this not promote 
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V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: IS DE-MEDICALISING ASSISTED DYING A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE 
WAY FORWARD? 
 
In the final part of this paper, I wish to address the pros and cons of de-medicalising assisted death 
in the ways I have suggested are occurring. First, the phenomenon of RFASA has fuelled the debate 
as to whether assisted dying should be de-criminalised. In 2008, 69 per cent of 2,000 members of 
the public who participated in a poll conducted for the Sunday Times supported a change in the law 
so that relatives in RFASA cases are given immunity from prosecution.157 Moreover, RFASA cases also 
reveal the importance of non-medicalised parts of the assisted dying process: the presence and 
support of relatives during the process as part of the individual’s subjective experience of a “good” 
assisted death, and of relatives’ subjective experiences regarding their loved one’s assisted death. 
There is perhaps even room for the argument that relatives’ experiences could and should play a 
role in shaping our understanding of the phenomenon of assisted death, if we are searching for less 
medicalised conceptions of assisted dying.158 Although this could be objected to on the basis that a 
presentation of assisted dying incorporating relatives’ experiences would be too emotional, we 
cannot escape the fact that death and assisted dying are emotional matters and a failure to take due 
account of this means that we are not seeing the true nature of the phenomenon. But whether a de-
medicalised model of assisted dying in which relatives are the assistors should be the way forward is 
a very different matter – the strong emotional attachment clearly raises the issue of objectivity. 
Furthermore, if those who assist are in a close familial relationship with the assisted person, it is 
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easier for any vulnerability of the latter to be taken advantage of. Factors that cause prosecution to 
be in the public interest according to the DPP’s policy, such as a non-compassionate motivation and 
pressure, will be harder to discover if there is no external involvement in the assisted dying process. 
For these and other reasons presented below, the model of assisted death this paper advocates is a 
partially de-medicalised one, involving external assistors. 
 
Although the DPP’s policy provides no guarantee of immunity from prosecution and ‘each 
case must be considered on its own facts and on its own merits’,159 it provides general guidance as to 
the public interest factors for and against prosecution in cases of assisted suicide. Effectively, the 
publication of this policy, as demanded by the House of Lords in Purdy, has done no more than 
maintain the status quo, albeit that the reasons for this status quo have now been made clear to the 
public.160 But the publication of the DPP’s statement of policy may well mean that relatives who 
accompany an individual abroad for an assisted death no longer have to ‘run the gauntlet of the 
criminal law before they can discover whether or not compassion will be exercised’.161 Moreover, 
the presentation of the circumstances in which relatives should have little fear of prosecution is 
likely to make the process of assisted dying a better, less clinical experience for some individuals 
who seek an assisted suicide abroad. An interview with a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis 
who planned to go to Switzerland for an assisted death was shown during a BBC News report in July 
2009. She explained how she has not told her carers and friends because she feared that anyone 
accompanying her would be prosecuted.  She poignantly stated that without this threat: ‘I wouldn’t 
have to go alone. I wouldn’t have to die alone.’162  
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By explicating the public interest arguments against prosecution of assistors in cases of 
assisted suicide, does the DPP’s policy not assist proponents of the legislation of assisted death? Is it 
not incongruous that we now have clearly stated public interest factors against prosecuting assistors 
in RFASA cases, at least in part for reasons of compassion, yet individuals who wish to die and those 
who accompany them are forced to go abroad to receive medical assistance to die? Could this be 
first step on a path that will lead to the eventual de-criminalisation of assisted dying?163 If so, the de-
medicalisation of the debate surrounding assisted suicide may ultimately strengthen the case for 
lifting the prohibition on (probably medicalised) assisted death.164 There remains a large chasm 
between maintaining the legal prohibition on assisted suicide whilst publishing public interest 
factors against prosecution, and de-criminalising assisted suicide. However, when taken with the 
results of the polls referred to above, the publication of the DPP’s policy can only draw attention to 
the marked discrepancy between on the one hand, the law on assisted suicide as laid down in 
statute and on the other, the law as applied in practice and public opinion. At the very least, high 
profile cases involving the matters of RFASA and RAS such as Purdy and the Gilderdale case ensure 
that assisted death and the moral legitimacy of the current legal position continue to be significant 
matters for public debate.165 In Purdy, Lord Brown presented a scenario involving: 
 
a loved one, in desperate and deteriorating circumstances, who regards the future with 
dread and has made a fully informed, voluntary and fixed decision to die, needing 
another’s compassionate help and support to accomplish that end… is assistance in those 
circumstances necessarily to be deprecated? Are there not cases in which… many might 
regard such conduct as if anything to be commended rather than condemned? In short, as 
it seems to me, there will on occasion be situations where… it would be possible to regard 
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the conduct of the aider and abettor as altruistic rather than criminal, conduct rather to be 
understood out of respect for an intending suicide’s rights under article 8 than discouraged 
so as to safeguard the right to life of others under article 2.166 
 
Whilst Lord Brown then swiftly emphasised that he was not expressing a view as to whether the law 
should be altered,167 the fact that a Law Lord was at least prepared to challenge the basis of the 
prohibition on assisted death in cases of suicides assisted by a relative should not go unnoticed.  
 
Notwithstanding the recent proposals which would have decriminalised the act of assisting a 
relative or friend to go abroad and seek assisted suicide discussed earlier, proposals for legal reform 
to permit assisted dying and laws under which assisted death is lawful under certain conditions tend 
to relate to medicalised, physician-assisted death.168 At the heart of the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill,169 for example, there lay ‘an assumption that the safest and most effective method 
of organising the regulation of assisted suicide is to ensure that it is conducted by health care 
professionals.’170 Critics of medical power challenge assumptions that a phenomenon can only be 
regulated effectively by doctors. In Salem’s view, for instance, ‘it is not (or not only) the need for 
technical expertise that impels us to physician-assisted suicide. Rather, our culture, so impregnated 
by medicalisation, takes for granted that assisted suicide should fall under the control and 
supervision of medicine.’171 It is the idea of our taking for granted the need for medical control over 
assisted dying that needs to be addressed, and one way we can do this is to consider the case for 
and against involving doctors in assisted dying.  
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It is important to bear in mind that the medical profession does not appear to be keen to be 
involved in legalised assisted dying. A survey completed by 3733 medical professionals in 2007-2008 
revealed that the majority were not in favour of legalising euthanasia or PAS.172 This position is 
supported by a vote taken regarding whether to support calls to legalise assisted death for patients 
who are ‘terminally ill and have mental capacity’ at a BMA conference held in July 2009.173 
Undoubtedly, it is the principle of non-maleficence that lies at the heart of the profession’s 
reluctance to assist in facilitating and causing a patient’s death.174 It is thus of note that Capron has 
suggested that the role of the doctor in an assisted death could be reduced to simply providing the 
prescription, so that ‘the physician is actually under less of a psychological or a moral impediment to 
acting.’175 But if the main motivation behind permitting assisted death is one of compassion, then 
arguably, the final act causing death should involve a doctor. Medicalised assisted death or 
euthanasia is the better option because doctors are better able to deal with the situation if things go 
wrong.176 Will a non-medic assistor be equipped to deal with situation where, for example, the 
individual vomits back the drugs?177 Bosshard refers to a Swiss case in which two individuals who 
wished to die were still alive (in a coma) several hours after they had taken the lethal drug and an 
Exit volunteer suffocated them both with a plastic bag.178 To be able to deal with such eventualities, 
however, the assistor in the final act does not necessarily have to be a doctor, but could instead be a 
specially trained nurse. Indeed, in the context of the Swiss model of assisted death, it has been 
                                                          
172
 C Seale, ‘Legalisation of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide: survey of doctors’ attitudes’ (2009) 23 
Palliative Medicine 205, 209. 
173
 ‘Doctors oppose legal protection for assisted suicide relatives’ The Guardian, 1 July 2009. BMA members 
who voted were ‘overwhelmingly’ against such legal reform. See ‘RCN neutral on assisted suicide’, BBC News 
Report, 25 July 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8167454.stm. Last visited 26 March 2010; 
D Cohen, ‘BMA Meeting: Doctors vote against protecting relatives who accompany people abroad for help 
with dying’ (2009) 339 BMJ 2699. A similar position appears to be taken by the medical profession in the 
United States - see Faber-Langendoen and Karlawish, 2000: 482. 
174
 D Sullivan, ‘Euthanasia versus letting die: Christian decision-making in terminal patients’ (2005) 21(2) Ethics 
and Medicine 109; Hurst and Mauron, 2003: 273. For a contrasting view, see S Woien, ‘Life, Death, and Harm: 
Staying within the Boundaries of Nonmaleficence’ (2008) 8(11) American Journal of Bioethics 31. 
175
 Capron, 1996: 17. 
176
 E Jackson, 2007: 41; Faber-Langendoen and Karlawish, 2000: 484. 
177
 I suggest that the means of causing death be lethal drugs because although there are non-medical means of 
causing death, as stated in section II, medication is considered to offer the quickest, non-violent end.  
178
 Bosshard, 2008: 475. 
43 
 
contended that where the volunteer is a nurse who has special training and experience, the final 
part of the assisted suicide process may be safer than if assistance were provided by a GP who has 
no specialist training and has not assisted in a suicide before.179  
 
Whilst an appropriately trained nurse could well fulfil this role at the end of the assisted 
dying process, the involvement of a medical professional at an earlier stage in the process remains 
necessary to make assessments that require medical expertise, such as whether any mental 
condition might be impairing a person’s capacity. As I will argue below, non-medical concerns 
relating to the individual’s free will can be assessed by someone without medical expertise, but 
evaluating certain aspects of capacity such as impairment of cognition requires psychiatric 
knowledge.180 Moreover, to convince those who are wary of legal reform to permit assisted dying 
because of concerns about ensuring that it is the free will of the person that s/he wishes to die, 
involving a doctor to evaluate the psychiatric aspects of capacity will in all likelihood have to be an 
essential requirement of any law permitting assisted death. Indeed, when Lord Alderdice sought to 
add a clause to the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009 (now Act) in the House of Lords which would have 
permitted assisted suicide where a coroner investigated the circumstances and was satisfied that it 
was the ‘free and settled wish’ of the individual to die, the coroner’s involvement in this matter was 
immediately rejected by other peers.181 Looking to the Swiss model again, as already noted, a doctor 
must conclude that a person is competent. This is also a matter ascertained (separately) by the 
volunteer from the right-to-die organisation. In cases where it is ascertained that depression affects 
an individual’s capacity for decision-making, the right-to-die organisation will not provide 
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assistance.182 It is of concern that volunteers of right-to-die organisations with no medical 
professional background and expertise are making decisions regarding the impact of depression on 
decisional capacity.183 Although a physician’s assessment is also required under the Swiss model, at 
the very least, this raises questions about the appropriateness of the role of non-medics regarding 
this significant matter.184 
 
Such concerns should lead to a rejection of Capron’s suggestion that the doctor’s role in 
assisted dying be limited to just providing the prescription. However, there are still good reasons for 
advocating some degree of de-medicalisation, such as the following: first, de-medicalisation could 
offer a better opportunity for those who wish to have an assisted death to die at home surrounded 
by their loved ones. This does raise the issue of whether, if assisted dying becomes lawful, de-
medicalisation along these lines would privilege those receiving an assisted death above those who 
die naturally. Should we divert significant funds to make death a “cosier” affair for the former, but 
not the latter? As a matter of justice, this would clearly seem unfair. Before taking forward partial 
de-medicalisation in the form of enabling an assisted death to occur in the home, it would thus be 
necessary to assess whether death in this environment could also be offered to patients in hospitals 
or hospices, for example, whose deaths are not assisted and to consider what is realistically 
achievable in a publically funded healthcare system. Secondly, partial de-medicalisation could mean 
that the professional involved in ascertaining non-medical competency issues is someone familiar to 
the person, who s/he has known and trusted for long period of time (a clergyperson or spiritual 
adviser, for example). Thirdly, de-medicalisation addresses the fact that a large proportion of the 
medical profession see PAS as violating the principle of non-maleficence and fourthly, a 
predominantly medicalised assisted death can be perceived in a negative light, as increasing medical 
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professionals’ power over life and death. Notably, according to the qualitative analysis undertaken in 
Seale’s study involving a 2007-2008 survey of medical professionals, some of those participants who 
were in favour of assisted dying qualified their support by ‘expressing concern about medical 
involvement, to the extent that some argued for a specialisation in assisted dying that might not 
involve doctors.’185 There may thus be some support within the medical profession for a more de-
medicalised model of assisted death.  
 
One way of partially de-medicalising the ‘ascertaining competency’ stage of the assisted 
dying process would be to adopt a legal model under which the non-medical concerns relating to the 
individual’s free will are assessed by other professional parties. As Faber-Langendoen and Karlawish 
contend,186 matters such as coercion, family dynamics and emotional and economic pressures do not 
require medical expertise, and could be addressed by social workers, nurses, clergypersons or other 
spiritual advisors.187 The physician’s role would then be limited to ascertaining the medical aspects 
of competency. The Swiss model does adopt such an approach by involving the representative from 
the right-to-die organisation in making assessments as to decision-making capacity. However, it is 
arguable that given the nature of the organisation, the assistor may lack objectivity regarding the 
request for assisted suicide. Significantly, in their study of the way in which assisted suicide requests 
were dealt with by Exit, Bosshard et al state: ‘we do not know how much the Exit Staff members 
were able to maintain the neutrality required for an objective assessment rather than succumbing to 
over-identification with the applicant’s particular point of view.’188 This may always be a concern 
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when the non-medic playing a role in the assisted dying process is from a right-to-die organisation.  
Conversely, if lack of objectivity is an issue, we might ask why we should trust doctors to behave 
more impartially than anyone else? Some doctors will be pro-assisted dying, some will be against. 
Would we choose not to trust the judgement of doctors who support assisted dying just because of 
their personal views? At least in the case of volunteers from right-to-die organisations, their 
personal views are known and provided checks regarding the procedure of assisted dying are in 
place, this should not pose a threat to the safety of the process. 
 
Related to this latter point, a final further reason for advocating a fuller role in the assisted 
dying process for the medical professional could be to ensure adequate review of the assisted dying 
process, whether this is prospective or retrospective review, and to better guarantee public 
accountability.189 However, this could again be ensured by the involvement of a professional non-
medic who is accountable for their actions to a professional regulatory body, and by ensuring there 
are proper checks and controls throughout the assisted dying process. It is significant that whether 
the assistor is a doctor, a non-medic professional or a relative, a relationship of trust is an important 
common denominator in all cases of assisted death. Those whose death is assisted trust that their 
assistors will fulfil their wishes and act in their interests rather than in self interest. The matter of 
public trust is also important - the public must trust those given the responsibility of assisting death 
to do so only in appropriate cases.190 This suggests that any professional person involved should 
belong to a profession in which the public are willing to place their trust.   
 
In essence then, if a partially de-medicalised model of assisted death is perceived to be 
desirable, the way forward could be a less medicalised, team based approach to assisted death. This 
could involve a doctor who would deal with the medical aspects of an individual’s competency, 
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confirm that any requirements regarding the existence of and nature of a medical condition are met 
and ensure that alternative treatment options had been explored. A non-medic professional familiar 
to the patient could then step in to address non-medical aspects of competency and to provide a 
supportive role throughout the remainder of the process, and a specially trained nurse could assist 
in the final act of assisted death. External review of the process to ensure that regulations are 
complied with could be carried out by regional review committees along the lines of the Dutch 
approach.191 Such partial de-medicalisation of assisted dying should occur in this jurisdiction to avoid 
other concerns that remain whilst UK residents must travel abroad for lawful assisted suicide, 
concerns which are outside of the remit of this paper.192 One possible option would be that this form 
of assisted death becomes part of the palliative care available in the UK, with assisted dying 
becoming available as a last resort either at a hospice, or, if practical (and affordable), in the 
person’s home.  
 
One of the first questions that would need to be answered to ascertain the feasibility of such 
an approach is whether non-medic professionals would be willing to be involved in an assisted 
death. Interestingly, in 2009, the Royal College of Nursing’s Council dropped its opposition to 
assisted dying in favour of a more neutral stance. The vote was taken after a three month 
consultation of members which received over 1,200 individual responses. 49 per cent of those who 
responded supported the concept of assisted suicide, whilst 40 per cent did not.193 Although this 
does not necessarily indicate that those nurses supporting assisted suicide would be willing to assist 
in the final act of suicide, it does at least suggest that a significant number of nurses do not consider 
the concept of assisted suicide to conflict with their professional ethics. The matter of ethics is also 
an issue for the professional non-medics who would be involved at other stages in the process. 
Would clergypersons feel comfortable taking on such a role given that, if they ascertain that an 
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individual is competent and this accords with doctor’s view, the door is then opened for the 
individual to go ahead and commit assisted suicide? Could they reconcile their facilitating role with 
their faith? If indeed there are such faith-based concerns, then the involvement of social workers 
might be more appropriate. However, if one of the purposes of de-medicalisation is to make the 
person who will have an assisted death more at ease by being surrounded by familiar people, would 
it not be necessary to consider the likelihood of the person who wishes to die having an existing 
professional relationship with a social worker? Or would this familiarity with a non-medic 
professional be gained during the assisted dying process? It is clear that partial de-medicalisation 
though the involvement of non-medics in the assisted dying process raises a number of questions 
that would have to be carefully addressed. 
 
Turning finally to the possibility of de-medicalising assisted death by extending the 
legitimacy of assisting death where the cause of suffering is non-medical, since the British Social 
Attitudes Survey indicates that the general public would be less keen to support assisted death in 
such circumstances, it seems this would be a step too far if any legal reform is to be consistent with 
the views held by a significant proportion of UK citizens. But the problem here may in fact be that 
assisted death is so commonly presented within a medicalised framework that the idea that a 
person should be able to receive assistance to die when suffering is existential receives little 
attention. If the concept of existential suffering was better defined and more familiar, this might well 
lead to a more informed public debate on whether assisted death should be de-medicalised in this 
way.  It should give us pause for thought that our preoccupation with the medical model of assisted 
death means that we are failing to give due regard to the parts of the subjective experience of 
suffering that are not medical.194 
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It is patently obvious that the issue of assisted death is not going to go away.195 And it is a 
phenomenon that inevitably possesses significant medical aspects whilst medicine and physicians 
offer the greatest chance of a “good” death. Given that legal, ethical, political and social discourses 
continue to reveal a preference for a medicalised model of assisted dying, the pragmatic way 
forward may well be to continue to present such a model in order to achieve legal reform. That is, 
even if there is no logical basis for a predominantly medicalised model, it is arguably better to 
advocate the model that is more likely to be acceptable to the legislature and the public.196 An 
analogy can be drawn here to the way in which abortion was “sold” to the legislature in the 1960s. 
Whilst the medicalised model of abortion has been heavily critiqued,197 at least framing abortion in 
this way secured a vital change in the law. Unless and until assisted dying in some form is de-
criminalised, any partially de-medicalised model of assisted dying may be more idealistic than 
realistic. But it remains the case that, as with abortion, death and assisted death by no means sit 
exclusively within the domain of medicine.198 The examples of the de-medicalisation of assisted 
death that have formed the focus of this paper serve to emphasise the critical social and emotional 
aspects of death and the dying process, and to question the appropriateness of physician 
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involvement throughout this process. These matters should not be overlooked or underplayed 
because of the prominence of the medical model of assisted death. 
 
